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Why Don’t Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away? 
 
 
Abstract:  Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as 
systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they 
know those colours to be illusory.  This appears to contrast with 
cases where a subject’s colour vision adapts to systematic 
distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles.  Given that each 
case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour 
perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of 
colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs 
in one case but not the other?  I argue that these cases and the 
relationship between them can be made sense of in light of an 
existing view of colour perception.  Understanding colours as ways 
in which objects and surfaces modify light, perceived through 
grasping patterns and variations in colour appearances, provides a 
framework from which the cases and their apparent disanalogy can 
be predicted and explained.  This theory’s ability to accommodate 
these cases constitutes further empirical evidence in its favour. 
 
Keywords: Colour Perception; Enactivism; Perceptual Adaptation; Synaesthesia 
 
 
 
1.  Synaesthetic Sensations and Special Spectacles 
 
Synaesthesia is a condition where some class of veridical perceptions is 
accompanied by sensations of another type.  For example, colour-grapheme 
synaesthetes’ visual perceptions of words or numbers are accompanied by colour 
sensations, or ‘photisms’.  In colour-phoneme, or coloured-hearing synaesthesia, 
photisms accompany the auditory perception of certain sounds.  Just how these 
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photisms are experienced varies across different subjects and different varieties 
of synaesthesia.  Some synaesthetes report experiencing a generic coloured 
shape, or a coloured visual image of the word or letter being seen or heard.  
Different synaesthetes describe their photisms as non-localised, overlaid upon or 
filling a visually presented letter, “bound to the sound” of an aurally presented 
one, or as located upon an invisible plane located at arms reach (Grossenbacher 
and Lovelace (2001))1.  
 
It is empirically well established that such sensations are genuine features of the 
experience of synaesthetes – subjects are not speaking metaphorically, or 
delusional, when they claim that they experience (for example) letters as 
accompanied by specific colours.  For example, verbal description of, and 
matching behaviour with respect to, the photisms that accompany specific 
stimuli are almost completely consistent over time, in contrast to the poor 
performance of non-synaesthetic control groups2.  But despite the fact that 
                                                 
1  Part of my aim in this paper is to argue for a particular way of understanding 
synaesthetic colour experience in general.  Given this variety in forms of such 
experience, one might wonder whether a general account is possible.  However, 
as we will see, I attempt to account for synaesthetic experience in terms of 
general considerations concerning the relationship between apparent and 
objective properties in colour perception.  This account could, as far as I can see, 
be applied equally to any of the forms of synaesthetic experience listed above.  
For simplicity’s sake, however, my examples shall concern synaesthetic 
experiences roughly as of colours overlaid upon graphemes. ‘Roughly’ since, as 
as I will argue, the way synaesthetic colours figure in experience prevents them 
from having objective spatial purport.  This eventual consequence of my account 
might be used to explain how and why some synaesthetes experience their 
photisms as non-localised.  Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting 
clarification here.  
2 Synaesthetes also exhibit priming and interference effects on perceptual tasks 
that support the hypothesis that they genuinely experience the illusory colours.  
There is also evidence that synaesthetic colours can contribute to pop-out effects 
that aid visual search.  See Edquist et al (2006) for a useful review. 
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photisms are genuine and persisting features of synaesthetic experience, and 
experienced in perceptually familiar colours, synaesthetes do not mistake 
synaesthetic experiences for experiences of real, worldly colours.  It seems they 
are automatically and implicitly aware that the synaesthetic colours with which 
aspects of their world are suffused are not a reflection of reality. 
 
One of the many puzzling aspects of synaesthesia is its apparent disanalogy with 
a comparably exotic fact about colour perception.  As part of a series of famous 
experiments on perceptual adaptation, Kohler (1964) claimed that subject’s 
colour categorizations and experiences adapted over time to the distortions 
created by wearing two-toned spectacles.  Subjects wore goggles with vertically-
bisected lenses, each of which had a blue-tinted left half and a yellow-tinted right 
half.  After several weeks of wearing the goggles whilst going about their daily 
business, subjects reported that the predictable disruption of colour perception 
caused by the goggles had faded away.  For example, one subject reported that, 
by the 36th day of wearing the goggles “Even though a great variety of yellow 
and blue stimuli are transmitted by my spectacles and keep impinging on my 
fovea, I no longer experience the corresponding colour sensations,” and that by 
the 46th day, “If I look first at the blue part and then at the yellow part of my 
visual field, the latter does not increase in intensity no matter how long I have 
looked at the former” (Kohler (1964), p.111-112).  
 
The subjective reports of participants were borne out by a test requiring the 
subjects to adjust a colour wheel to a neutral shade of grey, using a button that 
varied the colour of the wheel between shades of blue, yellow, and neutral grey.  
The initial donning of the goggles predictably disrupted the subjects’ abilities to 
perform this task, but after adaptation they could perform the task with similar 
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proficiency to their attempts before the goggles were donned (Ibid, p.106, 114).  
When the goggles were removed, subjects experienced the opposite sort of 
distortion in their colour perception to that which occurred when the goggles 
were first donned – in this case, the left half of the visual field was experienced as 
tinted yellow, and the right half as tinted blue.  For example, after removing the 
goggles Kohler reported that “Whenever I open up a book, I am amazed to find 
that the left page looks yellow, and that it looks white with a bluish tinge as soon 
as I turn it over to the right,” and that “When I take a walk, I am always 
conscious of a peculiar glare on my left, as if someone carrying a lighted candle 
were accompanying me; on my right, nothing of this kind occurs” (Ibid, p.115).  
Over time, this distortion also fades away, and subjects’ colour perceptions 
return to normal3. 
 
There appears to be a puzzling tension between these two cases.  In each case 
subjects’ colour-experience of the world is accompanied by regular and 
predictable patterns of illusory colours4, patterns which the subject knows are 
                                                 
3 Bompas and O’Regan (2006) note that there has been some difficulty in 
replicating Kohler’s results.  However, the main study they cite in support of this 
claim (McCollough (1965) – the other study cited is an unpublished Master’s 
thesis) confirms that the colour sensations caused by distorting goggles 
subjectively fade away over time, questioning only Kohler’s claim that new 
dependencies of colour perception on eye-movement occur as after-effects of 
adaptation.  Bompas and O’Regan (ibid.) succeeded in inducing such 
dependencies via a short period of conditioning without goggles. The fact that 
the distortions caused by the goggles adapt away over time is the most important 
aspect of Kohler’s results for the case I make in this paper, and seems well 
established.  In what follows I’ll be taking the results that Kohler reports at face 
value. 
4 It’s not quite right to label the colour appearances that characterise each case 
‘illusory’.  Subjects wearing Kohler’s goggles really are looking through tinted 
lenses, and seeing the world in just the way they should in light of this fact.  A 
consequence of the position for which I’ll argue in this paper (particularly in 
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not reliable guides to the real colours in their environments.  However, in 
Kohler’s cases, with exploration, habituation and time, the way things appear to 
be coloured falls into line with this knowledge.  In contrast, synaesthetes 
continue to experience the same patterns of illusory colours throughout their life, 
despite the fact that they know them to be illusory, and display no inclination to 
think otherwise.  How can a theory of colour perception account for both of these 
cases?  I want to suggest that the apparent asymmetry between these cases can be 
elegantly predicted and explained by an existing theory of colour perception5.  
According to enactive views of perception endorsed by Susan Hurley and Alva 
Noë (among others), perception is a matter of grasping our relationship to our 
surroundings through understanding the interdependence between our 
unfolding sensory experience and our actual and potential bodily activity.  
Kohler’s results appear to support such a view by showing that veridical 
perceptual experience returns as familiarity with the new patterns of dependence 
between movement and perception is achieved (Hurley (1998), Noë (2004)).  
However, synaesthetic colour experiences appear to provide a counterexample to 
the view – synaesthetes experience photisms with perceptually familiar colours 
                                                                                                                                                 
section 3) is that synaesthetic sensations are not strictly ‘illusory’ in that they are 
not experiences that purport to be of how things are actually coloured, and so 
don’t make a claim about colour properties that can be assessed as true or false.  
Both sorts of appearances are, however, ‘illusory’ in being unreliable guides to 
the way external things are really coloured.  With these caveats in mind, I’ll 
continue to describe the relevant colour appearances as illusory in what follows. 
5  One disanalogy between the two cases is that the causes of perceptual 
distortion are constantly present for the wearer of the goggles, but only present 
in certain contexts for the synaesthete.  It might be thought that such a difference 
in reliable presence of perceptual distortion and its causes can explain the fact 
that adaptation occurs in the former case but not the latter.  However, as we shall 
see in section 4, there are nuances in Kohler’s data on perceptual adaptation 
which this hypothesis can’t account for.  Thanks to Conor McHugh for 
prompting clarification on this point. 
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whilst understanding that the experienced colour neither varies with their 
movement, nor directly bears on the ways they might engage with their 
perceptible environment (Hurley and Noë (2003, 2007), Gray (2003), Noë and 
Hurley (2003)).  In what follows, I argue that an enactivist view of colour 
perception can explain both cases and their relationship.  Synaesthetic colour 
experience and its puzzling relationship to Kohler’s results are not a 
counterexample to enactivism about colour perception, but a novel source of 
empirical support for it. 
 
 
2. Colours as Ways of Changing Light 
 
An important reason for the longstanding philosophical intrigue surrounding 
colour and its perception is the way that colour seems uneasily poised between a 
subjective and an objective feature of the world.  On the one hand, we think of 
colours as real properties of objects, obtaining out in the environment, 
independently of our perception of them.  On the other, we know that mind-
dependent phenomena such as after-images and, it seems, synaesthetic 
sensations can be perceptibly coloured, and that in many cases the way a thing 
appears to be coloured to a perceiver is an unreliable guide to any of its objective 
properties.  Problems arise when theories of colour perception neglect either 
aspect of this duality.  Accounts that attempt to index colour to some physically 
specifiable property of objects appear to do justice to the way that colours 
usually present themselves to perceivers as real and enduring properties of 
objects, but have trouble accommodating the fact that afterimages and 
synaesthetic sensations can appear perceptibly coloured without any external 
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object instantiating a candidate corresponding physical property6.  Additionally, 
we can be made to perceive afterimages with impossible colours, such as 
supersaturated hues of orange, or impossibly dark shades of yellow, where 
constraints of physics preclude there being an object with reflectance properties 
that could stimulate our visual system in the ways required to perceive those 
colours7.  Problems such as these can motivate subjectivist accounts of colour 
perception, according to which colours are appearances – ways things look to 
perceivers – that might somehow correlate with physical properties of objects, 
but are not to be identified with them.  Focusing on appearances in this way 
allows such views to accommodate cases such as the afterimages mentioned 
above, but makes it difficult to accommodate the perceived objectivity of colour.  
When we see colours, it usually seems that we see not appearances, but enduring 
and objective properties of objects and surfaces, which can help us identify and 
keep track of them over time8. 
 
We can contrast objectivist and subjectivist accounts of colour perception, and 
the problems that face them, by considering what each of them says about the 
phenomenon of colour constancy.  When I see, for example, a uniformly coloured 
cream wall in natural light, it displays patterns of light and shadow across its 
surface that we might describe as variations in the way its colour appears to us.  
But the wall also looks to be a single colour across its surface, lit and shaded in a 
certain way.  Accounts of colour that focus on some objective property of the 
wall’s surface can easily accommodate the perceived uniformity of the wall’s 
colour, but struggle to account for the sense in which the lit and shaded portions 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Byrne and Hilbert (2003) and the commentaries by Cohen, Decock and 
van Brakel, and Matthen. 
7 See Churchland (2005) for a fuller account of these colours and how they can be 
produced, complete with colour plates that let interested readers experience the 
relevant afterimages for themselves. 
8 See e.g. Cohen (2000), McLaughlin (2003) and the related discussion in Matthen 
(2005), ch. 11. 
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of the wall appear different.    Accounts emphasizing subjective colour looks or 
appearances can account for those differences, but struggle to accommodate the 
natural sense in which we see the wall as uniformly coloured across its surface.  
A recent family of proposals (Broackes (1992, 2008), Noë (2004, 2008), Philipona 
and O’Regan (2006), Ward (2009)) suggests a natural way of doing justice to 
these two aspects of colour perception. An object or surface’s colour is its 
property of modifying incident into reflected light in a certain regular way.  We 
are able to perceive this property by understanding the way colour appearances 
systematically vary with lighting conditions.  Put differently, we perceive 
objective colours by understanding the significance of the colour appearances 
presented to us for the way in which objects and surfaces in our environment 
modify light.  So, the wall before me looks to be a uniform colour since I 
understand the significance of the patterns of light and shade across its surface 
for its constant way of modifying light.  There is also a sense in which the lit 
portions of the wall appear different to its shaded portions with respect to their 
colour – the appearance of a portion of my cream wall in shadow might differ 
from the appearance of a portion in good light by being just the same as the 
appearance of a brown wall in good light.  But my understanding of the 
significance of the patterns of light and shade upon the wall means that the 
shaded portion of the wall does not look to me as if it is brown – rather it looks to 
me like a cream wall in shadow. 
 
Colour, on this view, is an objective property that we perceive by understanding 
patterns of colour appearances.  We’ll go some way towards fleshing out this 
claim in the following sections, by seeing how it provides a framework that 
accommodates the problem cases with which we began.  But two brief points of 
clarification might be helpful.  Firstly, how does such a view characterize the 
nature of the appearance properties to which it appeals – the properties we refer 
to when characterizing the sense in which the lit and shaded portions of the wall 
look different with respect to colour?  The way a colour appears to a perceiver is 
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a function of its reflectance properties, the way it is illuminated, the perceiver’s 
location relative to it and facts about her perceptual apparatus and current state 
of adaptation.  The fact that properties of the perceiver and her relation to the 
coloured object are determinants of appearance properties secures a subjective 
aspect of colour perception. The presence of such a subjective aspect is 
compatible with various views about the way in which colour appearance 
properties and objective colour properties are related in experience.  We might 
hold that colour appearances, as they figure in experience, are purely subjective 
properties – ‘qualia’ that are causally dependent upon, though logically 
independent of, the above facts about the coloured object and the perceiver’s 
relation to it.  A lternatively, we might hold that colour appearances figure in 
experience only as objectively specifiable properties of coloured objects and their 
current relationship to the perceiver, eschewing talk of non-representational 
qualia.  On the first sort of view, the experiential difference between looking at 
the lit and shaded portions of the wall is due to a difference in qualia caused by 
objective properties of the wall, lighting conditions and perceiver.  On the second 
sort of view the experiential difference is simply due to a difference in the objects 
of perception – a lit portion of wall in one case and a shaded portion in the other.  
The account in this section, and which follows, is intended to be neutral with 
respect to these two options9. 
 The second point of clarification concerns the account’s appeal to 
understanding.  To perceive an object’s colour, according to the view under 
                                                 
9 For an instance of the first view, see Block (2007).  For an instance of the second, 
see Schellenberg (2008).  For what it’s worth, my own sympathies lie with a view 
according to which apparent and objective properties must be defined 
interdependently – objective colour properties must be specified in terms of the 
patterns of appearances which make them up, whilst appearances must be 
specified in terms of the objective properties which they can help to disclose.  See 
McDowell (2004) for a view with this structure.  Noë (2008) is also suggestive of 
such a view.  Unfortunately, spelling out and defending this view is beyond the 
scope of my task here.  As just noted, the account of colour experience developed 
here is intended as compatible with each of these various possibilities. 
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consideration, it is not enough for there to simply be patterns of colour 
appearances for a perceiver as they survey and move around their environment.  
The perceiver must also understand the way in which the objective colour 
properties of her environment are revealed through those patterns.  However, 
the exercise of such understanding doesn’t require conscious thought or 
deliberation about colour on the part of the perceiver, or an ability to articulate 
the patterns and relationships that it concerns.   When a painter uses paint that is 
almost yellow to depict a portion of a green book in bright sunlight and paint 
that is almost blue to depict its shaded part, they rely on our understanding of 
the ways in which green objects appear in different lighting conditions.  It is this 
understanding that lets us see what they paint as a book with a certain shade of 
green, lit in a particular way, rather than as a book that is half yellow and half 
blue.  But in order for us to see it in this way we do not need to think about 
appearance properties and their relations, or be able to articulate what it is about 
the way in which the book has been painted that lets us see it as green.  The kind 
of understanding to which the view under consideration appeals consists just in 
this ability to see an object’s true colour through the appearance properties it 
presents.  Such understanding would be absent if a perceiver were to see the 
depicted book as differently coloured across its surface, or as changing colour 
when it was moved with respect to the light source10. 
 
The view of colour perception just sketched has much to recommend it.  It can 
make sense of our tendencies to view objects from different angles and in 
different lighting conditions when trying to accurately perceive their colour, and 
the fact that colour-blind (and normal) perceivers make far fewer errors in colour 
                                                 
10 Clearly there is much more of interest to be said about the sort of 
understanding to which I appeal here – in particular about its relation to more 
advanced, conceptual forms of understanding. However, this brief 
characterization suffices for our purposes here: making the view under 
consideration tolerably clear, and setting the stage for the account of synaesthesia 
and perceptual adaptation which follows. 
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perception when freely exploring their environment in daily life than they do 
when classifying samples in uniformly lit and artificially constrained laboratory 
conditions11.  Identifying colours with functions of the way objects modify 
incident light into reflected light within certain parameters fixed by the limits of 
human colour vision yields accurate predictions of both the colours most likely 
to be given names across cultures and which hues will be judged to be ‘unique’ – 
unmixed with any other colour (Philipona and O’Regan (2006)).  Lastly, it can 
accommodate the motivations for both objectivist and subjectivist approaches to 
colour, and the intuitive observation with which we began this section – that 
colour is a feature of the world poised between the objective and the subjective.  
Colours are objective properties of objects and surfaces, but the boundaries of 
those properties are located via reference to the range of wavelengths to which 
we are perceptually sensitive, and we perceive those properties by 
understanding their relationship to patterns of appearances.  In the remainder of 
this paper, I want to suggest that this view also affords a promising account of 
the relationship between the two cases with which we began, and an answer to 
our titular question – why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away? 
 
 
3. Why Synaesthetic Colours Don’t Adapt Away 
 
A more accurate but unwieldy title for this paper might have been ‘Why don’t 
synaesthetic colours adapt away, whilst the illusory colours caused by Kohler’s 
goggles do?’ – for we might think that the fact that synaesthetic colours don’t 
adapt away only requires explanation when we note that systematic patterns of 
colour appearances that the perceiver recognizes to be illusory do adapt away in 
                                                 
11 This observation and several other facts about colour perception that are 
elegantly explained by this view are nicely discussed in Broackes (1992).  See also 
Myin (2001) and Broackes (2008) for arguments that the view shows inverted 
spectrum hypotheses to be wrongheaded. 
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other cases.   Another question we might think relevant here is why synaesthetes 
never mistake the colours of their photisms for real colours, obtaining in the 
world.  Whilst we might be puzzled about exactly how the illusory colours 
caused by Kohler’s goggles adapt away, there is no mystery over why they do – 
the new patterns of colour appearance adapt away because they mess up the 
useful abilities of perceivers to tell what colours things are by looking at them.  
The colours that pervade the perceptual world of the synaesthete do not do this – 
synaesthetes perceive the true colours of objects and surfaces around them just as 
well as normal perceivers do12.  In some sense, this serves to explain why 
synaesthetic colours don’t adapt away – since those colours don’t constitute a 
severe obstacle to veridical colour perception, no adaptation is required.  Again, 
there only seems to be a puzzle in this neighbourhood when we view the 
synaesthetic case alongside Kohler’s adaptation results.  Even if we take the 
persistence of synaesthetic colours to be explained by perceivers’ reliable abilities 
to distinguish them from real colours, we might still wonder what explains the 
disanalogy with Kohler’s case.  Why can’t Kohler’s subjects learn to live with 
their patterns of illusory colour looks as synaesthetes do?  Why should a pattern 
of illusory looks disappear in one case, but not in another?13  In this section I 
                                                 
12 In the majority of situations - as noted above (n.1) synaesthetic colours can be 
made to help or hinder certain perception and classification tasks via stroop or 
priming effects in carefully controlled lab conditions.  See Gray (2003) for a 
description of the A lien Colour Effect, where the colour-naming abilities of 
coloured-hearing synaesthetes are marginally slowed by incongruity between 
the colour to be named and the colour of the photism induced by real or 
imagined perception of the first phoneme in the colour’s name.  The presence of 
these small functional differences between the colour naming and classification 
behaviours of synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes is compatible with the point I 
am making here – that synaesthetes perceive objective colour properties 
sufficiently well that their lack of adaptation only looks puzzling when 
compared to Kohler’s cases. 
13 Of course, there are important differences between the two sorts of case.  For 
example, as an anonymous referee notes, Kohler’s subjects are in the throes of 
coping with a new perceptual distortion, whereas adult synaesthetes have a 
lifetime of experience of their synaesthetic sensations.  Perhaps, then, 
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want to suggest that the view of colour perception just sketched – as a matter of 
seeing an object or surface’s way of modifying light through understanding the 
patterns of appearances it presents – allows us to make sense of these questions 
together. 
 
That view of colour perception suggests that the peculiarity of each of our two 
cases lies in its pulling apart the subjective and objective aspects of colour 
perception.  If perceiving colour is a matter of seeing how things modify light 
through understanding the appearances they present, then synaesthetic colour 
experiences suggest that colour appearances can be divorced from their usual 
role of indicating, as part of a larger pattern of colour looks, objective colour 
properties. Kohler’s adaptation results show that perceptual grasp of objective 
colour properties can, given sufficient time, adapt to radical distortions in the 
usual patterns of looks underlying those properties.  Thus, our account suggests, 
synaesthetic colours fail to adapt away because synaesthetes do not take them to 
be indicative of objective colour properties in the same way as standard 
subjective colour looks, since synaesthetic colour looks fail to figure in larger 
patterns of subjective looks or vary with changes in colour-critical conditions in 
the usual ways.  Whilst aspects of the synaesthete’s perceptual world are 
suffused with illusory colour appearances, the view of colour perception 
outlined in the previous section gives us reason to believe that seeing colour 
appearances and seeing coloured objects and surfaces are different matters.  
                                                                                                                                                 
synaesthetic colours are experienced as distortive in infancy, or would be so 
experienced if suddenly induced in a mature perceiver.  The account to be 
developed below is compatible with these possiblities – it aims to explain how 
synaesthetic colour appearances figure in the experience of mature perceivers in 
a way that does not compete with their perception of objective colour.  In 
developing this view, we will achieve a clearer picture of the two cases and their 
relationship.  The juxtaposition of the two cases here serves only to set the stage 
for an account which adequately explains them both. 
 14 
According to that view, seeing objective colour properties is a matter of 
understanding patterns and regularities in the colour appearances presented to 
one.  Perceivers understand facts about the relationships between the apparent 
colours they currently experience, about how such appearances might change 
given changes in viewing conditions, and about how such interrelations between 
patterns of appearances and viewing conditions bear on the distribution of 
objective colour properties in their perceptible environment.  The colour 
appearances that accompany synaesthetic experiences are unusual in that they 
fail to figure in the kinds of patterns and relations through which perceivers see 
objective colours, and so do not bear in the usual way on how synaesthetes take 
things to be objectively coloured. When a synaesthete sees the appearance of a 
colour as overlaid upon a letter, or ‘in their mind’s eye’, or as located upon a 
vertical plane in front of them, the understanding of relationships obtaining 
between colour appearances that characterizes perception of objective colours is 
inappropriate, and not exercised.  Synaesthetic colours, on this view, are 
experienced as isolated colour appearances, and thus lack objective purport.  
This observation makes it intelligible why synaesthetic colour experiences do not 
interfere with normal colour vision, and thus why they don’t need to adapt 
away.  We noted above that the supposition that synaesthetic colours should 
adapt away gained plausibility from the assumption that synaesthesia involved 
some kind of systematic perceptual distortion that perceivers could learn to filter 
out, as in other cases of perceptual adaptation.  But understanding synaesthetic 
experience in light of our view of colour perception lets us see that this 
assumption is misguided.  Synaesthetic colour experience does not constitute a 
distorted perception of the way things in the environment are coloured, since the 
way in which synaesthetic colours figure in experience, floating free of the 
crucial patterns, relationships and regularities that usually obtain between colour 
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appearances, means that they are not presented to the subject as worldly colours 
at all.  Thus, the special ways in which things appear to synaesthetes need not 
interfere with veridical perception of the way the world is, since seeing colour 
appearances and seeing worldly colours are very different perceptual 
achievements.  The way the synaesthete sees things to be coloured does not need 
to adapt since that way is not properly described as distorted. 
 
By contrast, adaptation to the distortion in the perception of objective colour 
properties caused by Kohler’s goggles is advantageous for the perceiver, since 
the illusory colour appearances they introduce do constitute an obstacle to 
veridical perception of objective colours, as shown by the predictable disruption 
of the colour categorizations and judgements of Kohler’s subjects.  They do so by 
introducing a complex new set of relationships between apparent colours, 
viewing conditions and objective colour properties.  Adaptation consists in the 
perceiver’s acclimatizing to the new patterns of subjective looks that are now 
indicative of particular objective colour properties, and thus coming to see 
objective colour properties as distributed in the way they did before donning the 
goggles. Perceivers thus come to manifest an automatic perceptual grasp of a fact 
that they explicitly knew all along – that the aberrant looks caused by donning 
the goggles do not reflect the way objective colour properties are distributed.  
When the goggles are removed, they must relearn the old sets of relations 
between subjective appearances, viewing conditions and objective properties, 
and thus go through another period of perceptual distortion and eventual 
adaptation.  
 
On the view being proposed, the relation between colour appearances and 
objective colours is akin to the relation between letters and words in a language 
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that we understand.  You are able to take in the words on this page in virtue of 
your perceptual ability to discriminate various sorts of letters, coupled with your 
understanding of the way relationships between letters and the contexts within 
which they appear govern the way that they combine to form meaningful words.  
Similarly, you are able to see the colours of objects and surfaces in the world 
around you in virtue of your perceptual ability to discriminate various colour 
appearances, and your understanding of the way in which the relationships 
between, and the contexts of, such appearances bear on the way things are 
objectively coloured.  Note that this view does not imply that we experience only 
apparent colours, then go on to infer facts about objective colours on that basis.  
It would be implausible, I think, to suggest that when reading your experience is 
first and foremost of the letters on this page, with the words the letters make up 
inferred by you as a result.  Rather, your experience is directed straight at the 
words.  But holding this is surely compatible with holding that we can only see 
the words in virtue of abilities to see letters and understand the ways in which 
they combine to make words.  In a certain sense, exercise of such abilities is just 
what is involved in directly experiencing words.  Similarly, on the view being 
proposed, we directly experience objective colours – we have just given a certain 
story about what such direct experience amounts to, and how it is possible14. 
 
                                                 
14  Noë (2004, 2008, 2009) also uses this example to shed light on the relationship 
between apparent and objective properties in perception, and the role played for 
the perceiver by sensorimotor understanding.  As noted above, I offer the 
account of colour experience developed here as an elaboration of his enactive 
view.   Note that the above does not imply that letters or apparent colours cannot 
be direct objects of experience.  If you like, it’s possible (though, I think, 
surprisingly difficult) to focus only upon the letters on this page, bracketing their 
significance as constituents of words.  But this is certainly not how we usually 
look at things.  Similarly, it’s possible (though difficult) to focus on the ways in 
which the lit and shaded portions of my wall appear different, bracketing the fact 
that they are both aspects of the wall’s one true colour.  Again, it seems clear that 
this is not the way apparent colours usually figure in our experience. 
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According to our analogy, attempting to perceive colours through the distorting 
lenses of the goggles is like attempting to read words in a language you 
understand that have been written in a particular kind of code.  Familiar letters 
make up the words, but the way those letters combine to stand for sounds and 
words has changed.  Adaptation here would consist in gaining an understanding 
of the new way in which familiar letters stand for familiar sounds and words.  
Matters are complicated with Kohler’s goggles, though, by the fact that the ways 
in which patterns of appearances signal colour properties depend on the portion 
of the goggles through which things are currently seen.  Adaptation to the 
distortions caused by the goggles thus consists in coming to understand a 
complex new set of relations between head and eye positions, colour 
appearances, and objective colours.  Pursuing our analogy, this would be akin to 
learning to read familiar words, written in familiar characters, but in a code 
where the way those characters correspond to sounds and words varies 
systematically with the way in which the perceiver views them.  Kohler’s 
demonstrations of adaptation suggest that, in the case of colour perception, 
understanding of such complex sets of novel relationships can, over time, 
become automatic and unthinking, allowing direct perception of the objective 
colour properties responsible for the new patterns of appearance.  After 
adaptation, when the goggles are removed, perceivers’ understanding of the new 
ways in which appearances convey information about objective colour properties 
is no longer appropriate, and results in a complementary set of systematic 
distortions in colour perception to those which occurred when the goggles were 
first donned.  These distortions also fade away over time, as perceivers once 
again come to manifest their old understanding of the standard ways in which 
objective colours are revealed through apparent ones. 
 
Now, consider a perceiver who was somehow hardwired so that their 
perceptions of certain objective colours were systematically accompanied by 
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visual sensations as of certain letters15.  In such a case, the illusory letters have 
been wrested from their usual roles as embedded constituents of words.  We 
would not expect colours to have unusual semantic significances for such a 
perceiver, since letters only contribute to the perception of semantic properties 
when they figure as constituents of words in a language which the perceiver 
understands.  Our perceiver might still see the illusory letters as the sorts of 
things that are potential constituents of meaningful words.  But we would not 
expect the accompaniment of her colour perception by a series of isolated 
illusory letters to result in her perception of the world as having an extra layer of 
semantic significance.  Likewise, when a synaesthete perceives a printed letter as 
accompanied by the appearance of a particular colour, we need not expect this 
appearance to inform or compete with their perception of the letter’s true colour 
since we have good reason to think that perceiving colour appearances and 
perceiving objective colours are different matters.  Colour appearances convey 
information about objective colour properties in just the same way that letters 
convey information about semantic properties – by occurring as constituents of 
patterns that perceivers view with the right sort of understanding.  Synaesthetic 
colours do not figure in such patterns, and so aren’t perceived as having purport 
for the way in which things are objectively coloured.  And, as we’ve noted, 
recognizing this distinction between apparent and objective colour removes the 
motivation for supposing that they should adapt away. 
 
So, why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away?  Because there’s little reason 
why they should16.  There’s little reason why they should because the unusual 
                                                 
15 Such a perceiver would, of course, be the opposite of a colour-grapheme 
synaesthete.  To my knowledge, no cases of this kind exist. 
16 Little rather than none since, as noted above, synaesthetic colours can cause 
small impairments in colour naming and categorisation in certain circumstances.  
Once we see that synaesthetic colour experience can happily coexist with 
veridical perception of objective colours in the way outlined above there is little 
temptation to suppose (or so it seems to me) that such small impairments could 
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way in which they figure in the experience of synaesthetes is such as to 
automatically distinguish them from experiences of real, worldly colour.  
Synaesthetic and worldly colours are no more in competition in the experience of 
a synaesthete than are your visual experiences of the words and letters on this 
page.  Before proceeding, two clarifications might be helpful.  First, as noted 
above (fn. 13), this view is compatible with the possiblity that synaesthetic 
infants and children experience the colours of their photisms in a way that 
competes with their experience of objective colour, with their synaesthetic 
experiences only acquiring the benign character outlined above with learning 
and habituation.  Whether or not this is so depends on whether perceivers’ 
understanding of how patterns of colour appearances disclose objective colour 
properties is innate, or achieved at least in part through habituation and 
exploration.  The view developed here is neutral on this issue (though Kohler’s 
results show that such understanding can adapt and evolve when required to).  I 
aim only to show how the synaesthetic colour experiences of mature perceivers, 
however they are arrived at, need not compete with their experience of objective 
colour.  Second, this view is compatible with there being illuminating 
neuroscientific explanations of why synaesthetic colour experiences fail to adapt 
away.  For example, Hurley and Noë (2003) moot that the V4/ V8 activity that 
accompanies auditory perception in coloured-hearing synaesthesia could not 
adapt away or come to subserve only auditory phenomenology on pain of 
disrupting the veridical visual perception subserved by the same brain area.  The 
view developed here is compatible with this suggestion, complementing it with 
an explanation of why the synaesthetic colour experiences do not compete with 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitute a sufficient pressure toward adaptation.  Non-synaesthetes can be 
made to exhibit analogous impairments in naming and categorisation as a result 
of stroop effects (as when identifying the colour of the word ‘green’ typed in red 
ink), but since semantic and chromatic properties usually coexist happily in 
perception we need not assume that such cases constitute a pressure toward 
either semantic or chromatic perception adapting away. 
 20 
veridical colour perception.17  Our work here, however, is not yet done.  
Attentive readers might have noticed that something in this section’s treatment 
of Kohler’s adaptation results does not quite add up.  Before we can be satisfied 
with our diagnosis of synaesthetic sensations, we must address the fact that 
philosophical discussions of Kohler’s results thus far, including our own, have 
suppressed certain subtleties. 
 
 
4.  Special Spectacles Reassessed 
 
The last section made the case that synaesthetic colour appearances and veridical 
colour perception can coexist.  Once we appreciate the different way that colour 
appearances and objective colour properties figure in experience, we can see that 
experiences of synaesthetic and veridical colours need not get in each other’s 
way.  It was also suggested that adaptation to Kohler’s coloured goggles consists 
in coming to understand the new way in which objective colours are revealed 
through patterns of apparent colours that vary according to head and eye 
position.  But this account of adaptation seems to imply an account of the 
adapting subject’s phenomenology at odds with both our description in section 
one, and existing discussions of these results in the philosophical literature.  
Standardly, interpreters of Kohler’s results speak as if colour vision returns 
entirely to normal over the course of adaptation (Hurley (1998), Myin (2001), 
Pettit (2003), Hurley and Noë (2006)), and whilst we have not explicitly endorsed 
this assumption in our discussion of these results, neither have we questioned it.  
However, since our account claims that adaptation consists in learning to see the 
way objects modify light through the aberrant patterns of colour looks introduced 
by the goggles, shouldn’t we expect subjects in the experiment to report that 
                                                 
17 My thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting both these clarifications. 
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objective colour properties appear to be distributed as they did before the 
goggles were donned, whilst the patterns of colour looks presented by the world 
through the goggles remain distorted?  Our account of synaesthetic experiences 
suggests that veridical perception of objective colour can coexist with illusory 
perception of colour appearances.  It seems, then, that the natural prediction of 
the account developed in the last section should be not that the colour 
experiences of the adapting subject return completely to normal, but that their 
experiences of objective colour properties adapt, whilst the illusory colour 
appearances caused by the goggles remain. 
 
Does this prediction – that objects appear to be veridically coloured whilst the 
subject’s colour sensations remain distorted – even make sense?  Is there any 
evidence in its favour in Kohler’s reports?  In fact, strange as our prediction may 
sound, it appears to square very well with how subjects describe their 
experiences of adaptation.  For example, even after 60 days, at the height of his 
adaptation, and whilst reporting that objects appear veridically coloured, Kohler 
says that: 
 
“The distracting effect which the spectacles had in the beginning is 
completely gone now.  Now I actually feel comforted by the sight of a 
table which looks blue on one side and yellow on the other.  I am so used 
to it that I would get upset if it were otherwise…” (Kohler (1964), p.113)   
 
This suggests that whilst he perceives objects to be coloured as they were before 
he donned the spectacles, a focus on the way things subjectively appear to him – 
on patterns of colour looks or appearances – reveals that the illusory appearances 
caused by the spectacles are still present.  Similarly, twenty days after the 
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spectacles had been removed (with full re-adaptation occurring after thirty days), 
Kohler reports: 
 
‘I have become totally immune to the distracting influence of all these 
novel impressions.  I can now work for hours on end without being the 
least bit inconvenienced by this great variety of discolourations.  
However, I am still aware that they are there.’ (Ibid. p.115) 
 
This again suggests that adaptation consists in learning to see objective colour 
properties through the distortions in colour appearances that have been put in 
place, not in an alteration of those appearances themselves.  These kinds of 
reports are just what we would expect were the view defended in the previous 
section correct. 
 
We also noted in section 1 that subjective reports of perceptual adaptation are 
supported by improved performance at a task where the subject must manually 
adjust the hue displayed by a colour wheel until it contains no traces of blue or 
yellow.  However, we did not mention there that subjects’ performance at this 
task improves by only fifty percent, a finding apparently at odds with their 
reports about the extent of their adaptation18.  But, if our diagnosis of Kohler’s 
case is correct, this too is just as it should be.  This is because it seems that such a 
matching task probes the subject’s experience of both apparent and objective 
colour.  To see this, consider what we know about apparent colour on the basis 
                                                 
18 “A blue of one half its initial intensity on the colour wheel was sufficient to 
compensate for the yellow of the spectacles, and the blue of the spectacles was 
judged to be completely equal to gray – in other words, the subject no longer 
perceived it as colour.” (Ibid. p.114)  This fact is also neglected in existing 
philosophical discussions of Kohler’s results. 
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of our characterization thus far.  Apparent colour, on our account, is that through 
which objective colour is revealed.  Whilst apparent colours are unreliable guides 
to objective colour properties when taken in isolation, understanding patterns of 
such appearances and how they might vary with lighting and other conditions 
lets a perceiver see the objective colours of objects and surfaces – their constant 
ways of modifying incident into reflected light.  We know that apparent colour 
can vary according to the background against which a colour is viewed (the same 
patch will look lighter against a black background than it does against a white 
one), according to lighting conditions (the same patch will appear differently in 
bright sunlight, artificial light, and dusk) and the state of adaptation of the 
perceiver (everything appears darker when we first come indoors from bright 
sunlight), and that all these parameters can vary whilst a subject’s perception of 
objective colour remains unchanged.  Probing a subject’s discriminatory 
capacities with regard to apparent colour will thus involve holding all these 
factors constant as best we can.  By contrast, we should let those factors vary if 
we are interested in obtaining a measure of the objective colour properties a 
perceiver can discriminate19.  Kohler’s matching task consists in a stationary 
perceiver categorizing single colour patches, presented against a uniform 
background, under fixed lighting conditions.  Our view thus predicts a 
discrepancy between the accuracy of subjects’ colour discriminations in these 
                                                 
19 Recall the observation from Broackes (1992) about colour-blind perceivers, 
mentioned in section 2, above.  Their colour discrimination is markedly better in 
free vision than in constrained laboratory settings, suggesting that the 
impairment in their ability to perceive objective colours is less severe than the 
impairment in their ability to perceive apparent colours. 
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circumstances and the discriminations they make whilst freely exploring a 
naturally lit environment.  And such a discrepancy is just what Kohler found20. 
 
These important nuances in Kohler’s findings, so far neglected in existing 
philosophical work on those results, are thus predicted and explained by the 
theory we have been developing.  If perceiving colour consists in coming to 
understand how colour appearances presented in a particular context signify 
objective colour properties, Kohler’s results are exactly what we should expect. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  
Perceiving colour, according to the view we have been considering, involves 
grasping how objective colour properties are revealed through patterns of colour 
appearances.  Perception of worldly colour is perception of an objective property 
– the way an object or surface modifies light.  But we lock onto this property in 
perception via an understanding of appearance properties – properties 
determined by facts about our current perceptual relationship with our 
environment, such as our current state of adaptation and location with respect to 
objects and light sources.  Colour perception thus has a subjective and an 
objective aspect.  We see objective properties by understanding how we, as 
perceiving subjects, are related to our environment.  If this view were correct, we 
                                                 
20 Kohler (Ibid. p.45) explicitly notes the discrepancy between subjects’ reports of 
adaptation and their abilities in the discrimination task, but offers no explanation 
of it.  A consequence of our view here is that we should expect tests of adaptation 
to differ in their results according to the extent to which they hold the parameters 
that fix appearance properties constant, and that the measures suggesting 
greatest adaptation will be those most closely approximating free vision. 
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might expect to find cases where such understanding can be mistaken or 
manipulated, or where the subjective and objective aspects of colour perception 
come apart.  I have suggested that we should understand synaesthetic colour 
experience, Kohler’s adaptation results, and the relations between them in just 
these terms.  The colour-grapheme synaesthete sees the letters on this page as 
systematically accompanied by illusory appearances of colour.  But as skilled 
perceivers of colour they also implicitly understand that colour appearances 
disclose objective colour properties only by figuring as constituents in patterns of 
appearances that evolve and change in ways that reflect changing relations 
between perceivers, objects and light sources.  Synaesthetic colour appearances 
don’t figure in such patterns, and so don’t present themselves as carrying 
information about the colours of objects and surfaces in the synaesthete’s 
environment.  This, I suggested, explains why synaesthetes don’t mistake their 
photisms for worldly colours, and thus why there’s no need for synaesthetic 
colours to adapt away. 
 
How things appear with respect to colour is also systematically distorted for the 
wearer of Kohler’s coloured goggles.  The goggles introduce a new determinant 
of the way things appear to the perceiver with respect to colour – the part of the 
coloured lenses of the goggles the perceiver is currently looking through.  But the 
ways objects are coloured – the ways in which they modify light – remain 
constant.  Adaptation consists in regaining a perceptual grasp of this fact, and 
this is made possible by the fact that objects reveal their surface colours through 
patterns of appearances in an invariant way once the goggles are donned.   This 
way differs from the way in which colours are revealed through patterns of 
appearances without the goggles, since gaze direction is now a partial 
determinant of appearances and the ways in which those appearances vary.  We 
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thus have an account of colour perception that lets us see why one sort of 
perceptual distortion adapts away whilst the other does not.  In the previous 
section, we noted that our view implies an account of Kohler’s adaptation results 
at odds with that which we find in existing discussions, which suggest that the 
colour experiences of adaptees return completely to normal.  Our view instead 
suggests that the way things appear with respect to colour for Kohler’s subjects 
will continue to differ from normal perceivers – as we might expect, given that 
they continue to view the world through tinted spectacles.  But, our account 
suggests, this need not prevent the way they experience objects as being coloured 
from adapting.  This unorthodox view of the perceptual experience of adaptees is 
borne out well by a closer look at the reports of Kohler’s subjects. 
 
We thus have an account that predicts and explains both nuances in Kohler’s 
results that existing discussions ignore, and the apparent disanalogy between 
Kohler’s cases and synaesthetic colour experience.  Seeing an object’s colour 
consists in understanding the significance of patterns of colour appearances for 
the way it modifies light.  It is in light of this view, I have suggested, that we can 
arrive at a proper understanding of these cases and their significance for our 
thinking about colour and perception. 
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